This paper analyzes the post-crisis slump in 30 European economies during the 2008Q1-2014Q4 period using the business cycle accounting (BCA) method à la [Chari, V. V., P. Kehoe, and E. McGrattan. 2007 . "Business Cycle Accounting." Econometrica 75 (3): 781-836]. We find that the deterioration in the efficiency wedge is the most important driver of the European Great Recession and that this adverse shock persists throughout our sample. Moreover, we find that countries with higher growth in nonperforming loans feature a smaller decline in efficiency wedges. These findings support the emerging literature on resource misallocation triggered by financial crises.
Introduction
While more than seven years have passed since the onset of the Great Recession, European countries have shown only mild signs of recovery. Moreover, there is little consensus on why this is the case. This paper quantitatively analyzes the post-crisis slump in Europe from 2008Q1 to 2014Q4 with the business cycle accounting (BCA) method à la Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (CKM 2007) and sheds light on potential mechanisms of financial nature that can account for this episode.
BCA is a useful tool to decompose business cycle fluctuations into their contributing factors. The idea behind this approach is to inform researchers about which classes of economic models are most promising in accounting for economic (mis)performances. The accounting procedure is conducted as follows. First, several exogenous frictions called wedges are defined in equilibrium conditions of an otherwise standard Real Business Cycle model. Second, the stochastic process of these wedges are structurally estimated. Third, the wedges are backed out using data and the model solution. Finally, the wedges are put back into the model, one by one, in order to quantify their relative importance on the drop in output, consumption, investment, and labor.
The BCA method has been widely applied to the analysis of specific business cycles episodes in various countries. CKM ( 2007) focuses on the Great Depression and early 1980s recession in the U.S. Saijo (2008) investigates the Great Depression in Japan. Klein and Otsu (2013) compares the interwar Great Depressions in the U.S. and Western Europe. Cavalcanti (2007) studies the business cycle fluctuation in Portugal from 1979 to 2000. Kersting (2008) studies the UK recession in the 1980s. Kobayashi and Inaba (2006) studies the Great Depression and lost decade in Japan. Chakraborty (2009) investigates the sources of the boom and bust in Japan during the 1980s and 1990s. Lama (2011) focuses on output drops in Latin America during the 1990s. Otsu (2010) studies the 1998 crises in East Asia. Cho and Doblas-Madrid (2013) compares 23 financial crisis episodes over the 1980-2001 period. Chakraborty and Otsu (2013) analyzes the growth episodes of the BRICS economies. Brinca (2014) studies 22 OECD countries over the 1970-2011 period. Most of these studies show that efficiency and labor wedges are important in accounting for output fluctuations.
The outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis led to a rash of research on the nature of financial crises in quantitative macroeconomic models. Buera and Moll (2015) and Khan and Thomas (2013) construct models with heterogeneous firm level productivity in which credit shocks to borrowing constraints lead to misallocation of production factors across firms. Gertler and Karadi (2011) , Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) , and Gertler, Kiyotaki, Keisuke Otsu is the corresponding author. ©2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. and Queralto (2012) construct models with financial frictions in the banking sector which constrains investment. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) constructs a model with a working capital constraint on employment where an increase in the firm's borrowing cost increases the cost of labor. These models, through the lens of business cycle accounting, can be mapped into prototype models with efficiency, investment and labor wedges. We can therefore use our business cycle accounting results to infer potential channels through which the financial crises have operated.
Our paper is closely related to Brinca, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (BCKM 2016) which investigates the Great Recessions episode in 24 OECD countries using the BCA method. While BCKM ( 2016) investigates the decline in output between the respective peak and troughs in 24 OECD countries, we analyze the cross-country differences of the post-crisis slump in 30 European countries over the 2007Q4-2014Q4 period. Moreover, while we share 16 out of the 24 countries in their sample, we have a wider coverage of European countries in our sample which enables us to conduct a more thorough cross-sectional analysis on the BCA results within a European context. Indeed our main value added to BCKM ( 2016) is that we can investigate European regional differences and provide a potential explanation to the BCA result by studying the relationship between the deteriorations in wedges and financial variables in a cross-country framework.
The main finding of this paper is that the distortion in the representative firm's production function (the efficiency wedge) is mainly responsible for the prevalent output decline in Europe coinciding with the onset of the crisis in early 2008. This is consistent with the literature that links aggregate productivity losses to the misallocation effect of credit crunches. We further find that a subset of financial variables is significantly associated with the cross-country differences in the magnitude of the wedge deteriorations. Countries with less decline in market capitalization, higher level and growth in non-performing loans relative to total loans and less decline in housing prices experienced less deterioration in efficiency wedges. Also, countries with less decline in the housing price index experienced less deterioration in labor wedges.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: The second section describes the data. The third section introduces the BCA model. The fourth section presents the quantitative analysis. In the fifth section we discuss possible association between financial variables and output performances. The last section concludes. The countries in our sample are listed in Table 1. 1 We also report the detrended output decline between 2007Q4 and 2014Q4 for each country in percentage points. The only country that seems to have recovered from the crisis is Malta with an output growth of 16.6%. All other countries have not recovered to their pre-crisis trend level. Clearly, some countries experienced greater declines in per capita output than others. Countries which suffered the most are Greece (56.1% drop), Estonia (48.7% drop) and Latvia (48.6% drop). 12 out of 30 countries experienced an output drop greater than 25% and 23 experienced one greater than 15%. In the following we look into country specific data in order to compare the experiences of each country. We obtained quarterly data for output, consumption, investment, total hours worked (as a measure for labor input) from the European System of Accounts (ESA) 2010 data base through Eurostat. The data spans from 1995Q1 to 2014Q4. The expenditure data for output, consumption and investment are obtained in 2010 chained Euros. For periods in which ESA 2010 expenditure data is missing, the series is extrapolated using the ESA 2005 expenditure data. For periods in which ESA 2010 total hours data is missing, ESA 2005 data is used whenever possible. If neither quarterly total hours worked exists in the ESA 2010 nor in the ESA 2005 data base, we use quarterly employment and hours worked per worker data from the OECD Economic Outlook. Population is defined as the number of people aged 15-64 years old and is obtained through Eurostat.
Data
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In order to match data to the model, we make several data adjustments following CKM ( 2007) and BCKM ( 2016) . Private consumption expenditure in the data consists of household expenditure on non-durable goods, semi-durable goods, durable goods, and services. The expenditure on non-durable goods, semi-durable goods, and services are included in consumption while durable goods expenditures are considered as investment. 3 We impute the service flow from the durable stock and add them to consumption and total output. We subtract sales tax from consumption expenditures and output. 4 In sum, our consumption includes expenditure on non-durables, semi-durables, services, and the imputed service flow from durable stock less the sales tax on consumption. Our investment contains gross domestic capital formation and the expenditure on durable goods less the sales tax on the purchases of durables. Finally, our output consists of GDP and the imputed service flow from durable stock less the total sales tax.
In order to define a stationary economy, all variables are detrended by their respective growth trends:
where Y t is total output, C t is consumption, I t is investment, H t is labor input, N t is the population growing at the rate (1 + n), and Γ t is the trend component of labor augmenting technological progress growing at the rate (1 + γ). Figure 2 shows the cross-country mean of the detrended variables normalized at 2007Q4 = 0. Per capita output, consumption and investment data are logged and then linearly detrended by the labor augmented technological progress while per capita labor data is logged and demeaned. 5 We proxy the rate of labor augmenting technical progress γ with the average growth rate of output per adult over the 1995Q1-2007Q4 period. 6 The solid line with circular markers is the mean value of the data and the dashed lines represent the 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Notice that the post crisis decline in average output is considerably larger than the aggregate output decline in Figure 1 . This indicates that there are several small countries with large per capita output drops. For convenience we will use the simple mean figures throughout this paper. 7 We can clearly see that output and consumption decline rapidly during the first few quarters of the crisis. This decline continues until the end of the observation period in the last quarter of 2014. It is important to recognize that both variables do not show any sign of recovery throughout the entire period. At the end of 2014, average output declined almost 24% and consumption declined almost 25% relative to their respective pre-crisis levels. For both cases neither the level nor the growth rate has recovered to its pre-crisis trend, hence, a recovery from the initial shock and end of the Great Recession is still wishful thinking, at least up to 2014.
Investment on the other hand shows an even more radical picture. It drops in the first six periods of the crisis by almost 35%, more than three times the size of the drop in output during the same period. It temporarily settles down after that just to drop by another 20% in mid-2011. At the beginning of 2013 it settles down again and remains at this level of more than 40% below trend. As shown by the confidence interval, some countries even experience a drop in investment expenditures of almost 60% compared to their pre-crisis trend level.
Labor input, as measured by total hours worked per capita, increases almost 2% at the beginning of the crisis. After this increase it goes into steep decline until the beginning of 2013 and then slightly recovers but still remains 4% below the trend level by the end of the observation period.
Benchmark prototype model
The benchmark prototype model follows CKM ( 2007) with 1) a representative household that maximizes its lifetime utility gained from consumption and leisure, 2) a representative firm that maximizes profits by periodically choosing how much labor to hire and capital to rent, and 3) the government that collects distortionary taxes in order to finance its exogenous expenditure.
Household's problem
The representative consumer maximizes its expected lifetime utility:
where E is the expectation operator for all future values at time 0, and β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor for future utility.
The period utility depends on consumption c t , and leisure 1 − h t :
where ψ is a preference weight parameter. The household's budget constraint is
where w t is the wage rate, r t is the real rental rate, k t is the capital stock, π t is the firm's profit paid to the household as the dividends to the owner of the firm, τ t is the lump-sum transfer from the government, and i t is investment. τ h,t and τ i,t are the tax rates on labor income and investment, respectively. The capital stock follows the law-of-motion:
where δ is the depreciation rate and Λ is the growth trend of the economy which consists of population growth and labor augmenting technological progress.
Firm's problem
The firm maximizes profits:
by choosing labor input h t and capital k t , and thereby determining output y t . The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
where z t is the stationary productivity shock and θ is the capital share.
Government
The government sector collects taxes in order to finance its expenditure and rebates the remainder to the consumer in form of lump-sum transfers. Hence, the government's budget constraint is:
where g t stands for government consumption. If we substitute the government budget constraint (7) and the firm's profit (5) into the household budget constraint (3) we obtain the resource constraint:
Wedges
For convenience, we define efficiency, government, investment and labor wedges as follows. 8 The efficiency wedge is defined as:
which is equivalent to productivity shocks.
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The government wedge is defined as the difference between the goods produced in an economy, and the goods available to its private agents:
which is equivalent to government consumption. The investment wedge is defined as a friction in the capital Euler equation
which drives a wedge between the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution of current consumption to future consumption and the marginal return to investment. The labor wedge is defined as a friction in the labor market equilibrium condition
which drives a wedge between the intra-temporal marginal rate of substitution of leisure to consumption and the marginal product of labor.
Stochastic process
In the cases of efficiency, labor, and government wedges, the values can be computed directly using data and the equilibrium conditions. In the case of the investment wedge, however, it is not so simple because as seen in equation (11) current investment wedges depend on expected future variables. It follows that in order to compute the investment wedge in time t, we need to understand the stochastic process governing economic variables to make inferences about how the economy is going to behave in subsequent periods. We assume that the wedges { , , , , , , ℎ, } ∞ =0 follow a stochastic process.
where
′ , P is a 4 × 4 transition matrix, and ε t = (ε e,t , ε g,t , ε i,t , ε h,t ) ′ are innovations that have a standard normal distribution with zero-mean and a variance-covariance matrix V. 10 The "∼ " throughout this paper is a notation for the log deviation from the trend of each variable.
Equivalence results and the financial crisis
A useful interpretation of the prototype model is that it nests several classes of detailed models. In context of the recent financial crisis, Buera and Moll (2015) shows that we can map several credit crunch recession models into prototype models with efficiency, investment and labor wedges. The common feature of these models is that each firm i faces a constraint on external finance which states that the borrowing d cannot exceed a fraction of capital k:
A tightening of the borrowing constraint in the form of a drop in θ represents a credit crunch. BCA can be used to analyze whether and how the channels highlighted by credit crunch recession models might have operated during the financial crisis.
Efficiency wedge, ω e,t
The efficiency wedge is observationally equivalent to the Solow residual which is often referred to as "measured productivity". This can include technological progress driven by inventions and innovations, factor utilization, accumulation of human capital and general production efficiency. This can also include allocative efficiency of the aggregate economy. CKM ( 2007) shows that a model with input financing frictions in which heterogeneous credit spreads faced by intermediate goods producers lead to suboptimal resource allocation can be mapped into a prototype model with efficiency wedges. Buera and Moll (2015) shows that a model with heterogeneous firm productivity and external borrowing constraints can be mapped into a prototype model with efficiency wedges. 11 In their model, a tightening of the borrowing constraint reduces the amount the more productive firms can borrow and increases resources allocated towards less productive firms which would otherwise have been allocated to the more productive firms.
Investment wedge, ω i,t
The investment wedge is defined as a distortionary tax on investment expenditures. However, various market distortions and shocks can be observationally equivalent to investment wedges in a business cycle accounting context. CKM ( 2007) shows that a model with financial frictions arising from costly state verification as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) can be mapped into a prototype model with investment wedges.
12 Inaba and Nutahara (2009) shows that a financial friction model à la Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) can be mapped into a prototype model with investment wedges. Klein and Otsu (2013) shows that a model with expectational shocks to future output can be mapped into a prototype model with investment wedges. BCKM ( 2016) shows that a model with financial frictions arising from a bank collateral constraint as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) can be mapped into a prototype model with investment wedges. In their model, they assume an exogenous decline in the quality of capital as the direct financial shock. Buera and Moll (2015) shows that a model with heterogeneous investment costs among firms can be mapped into a prototype model with investment wedges. In their model, a tightening of the borrowing constraint will prevent resources from flowing into the firm with the lowest investment cost and hence increases the marginal cost of investment.
Labor wedge, ω h,t
The labor wedge is defined as a distortionary tax on labor income. However, various market distortions can manifest themselves as labor wedges. CKM ( 2007) shows that a model with nominal wage rigidity and monetary shocks can be mapped into a prototype model with labor wedges. Klein and Otsu (2013) shows that a model with time varying labor union bargaining power as in Cole and Ohanian (2004) can be mapped into a prototype model with labor wedges. Otsu (2010) shows that a model with a working capital constraint on labor as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) in which an increase in labor cost due to rising credit spreads can be mapped into a prototype model with labor wedges. Buera and Moll (2015) shows that a model with labor search frictions and heterogeneous recruitment costs among firms can be mapped into a prototype model with labor wedges. In their model, a tightening of the borrowing constraint will prevent resources from flowing into firms with lower recruitment cost and hence increase the marginal cost of labor.
Government wedge, ω g,t
Although the government wedge is not directly linked to the credit crunch per se, it is worth mentioning how government expenditure evolved in Europe during the post-crisis slump period. In November 2008 the European Commission proposed a 200 billion Euro European Economic Recovery Plan and recommended EU member states to implement national expenditure plans approximately equal to 1.2 percent of GDP. This should increase government wedges and increase output through a boost in aggregate demand. However, several European countries countered these plans later on and introduced fiscal austerity measures in fear of the increasing government debt. Fiscal consolidation should have the opposite effect on output from that of the fiscal stimulus plan.
Quantitative analysis
The business cycle accounting procedure follows CKM ( 2007) . In the first step, parameter values are obtained through calibration and structural estimation using linearly detrended data. In the second step the model is solved numerically through linear solution methods. In the third step, wedges are backed out using the linearized decision rules and linearly detrended data. In the last step we plug in one wedge at a time and simulate the model in order to decompose the business cycle fluctuations into the contributions of each wedge. Table 2 shows the list of parameters we calibrate in order for the model to match data over the 1995Q1-2007Q4 period which we define as the pre-crisis period.
Calibration
13 All parameters are country-specific and are calibrated to data of each country.
14 We report the average value and the highest and lowest among the 30 countries. The list of country-specific parameter values are available upon request. The depreciation rate δ is calibrated to match the capital law-of-motion:
to the average capital stock and investment data of Penn World Tables 8.0. Since the data is in annual frequency, we divide the average annual depreciation rate by 4 in order to obtain the average quarterly rate of depreciation. The capital share θ is calibrated to match the labor share data computed by the method described in Gollin (2002) . First, the naïve labor income share is computed as 1 − = Compensation of Employees GDI − Taxes on Production and Imports less Subsidies , where GDI stands for Gross Domestic Income. Then, the labor share of income is adjusted for self-employed workers:
The data for compensation of employees, taxes on production and imports less subsidies, and number of employees are obtained from Eurostat.
The growth trend Λ is computed as the average quarterly growth rate of total output. This consists of the average growth of population n and the labor augmenting technical progress γ where Λ = (1 + n)(1 + γ).
The subjective discount factor̂is calibrated to match the steady-state capital-output ratio in the capital Euler equation to that in data aŝ=
Notice that for convenience we have defined the discount factor as
The preference weight parameter ψ is calibrated to match the steady state labor input level in the labor first order condition to that in data as = 1
(1 − ) * *
We assume that the available working hours is 14 hours per day and normalize total hours worked per quarter h as ℎ = total hours worked adult population × 14 × 
Estimation
Since we cannot directly observe investment wedges, we structurally estimate the stochastic process of the wedges using data of output, consumption, investment and labor treating all wedges and the capital stock as latent variables. The estimation is based on a linearized state space model
The vectors X t and Y t include the state variables = (̃,, ,, ,, ,h , ) ′ , and observables = (̃,̃,,h ) ′ . We assume that the measurement error in the measurement equation η t is equal to zero for all periods.
In the original CKM ( 2007) paper, Maximum Likelihood Estimation is used to estimate the parameters. It turns out that the MLE results are not reliable for almost all countries in our data set due to the flatness of the likelihood function. 15 In order to avoid this issue, we applied the Bayesian method with Dynare as described in Adjemian et al. (2011) . The estimation priors are listed in Table 3 where P jj and P jk stand for the diagonal and off-diagonal terms in the transition matrix P while σ j and corr(ε j , ε k ) stand for the standard deviations and cross-correlations of the error terms. For the choice of prior distribution shapes for P jj (Beta) and σ j (Inverse Gamma) we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) . Since they do not have parameters equivalent to P jk and corr(ε j , ε k ) we simply assume Normal distribution. 
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Accounting results
Given the parameter levels obtained through calibration and estimation, we define the linearized decision rules of the model as follows:+
is a (4 × 1) vector and γ v,ω is a (4 × 4) matrix. The decision rule parameters in γ k,k , γ k,ω , γ v,k and γ v,ω are solved through a standard linear solution method described in Uhlig (2001) .
We assume that the economy is at steady state in 2007Q4 so that2 007 4 = 0. Then, we can compute the full series of detrended capital stock from the linearized capital law of motion
starting from t = 2007Q4 given that̃is observable.
From the decision rules of the observable variables (22) we can compute the wedges for all periods as
given that̃is observable. The simulation is conducted by plugging in each wedge one by one into the model:
where j = e, g, i, h. By construction, as shown in Otsu (2012) the sum of all simulated series will perfectly replicate the data fluctuations:
In the following section, we decompose the post-crisis slump of output into the contributions of each wedge: 
By construction, the contributions will sum up to one. At the beginning of the crisis the efficiency wedge begins its steep descent. At the end of the observation period it is around 23% below its trend level. The labor wedge initially jumps up slightly at the onset of the crisis, but after that it declines until the beginning of 2013 when it starts to slightly recover. The investment wedge shows a sudden 3% drop in 2009 and gradually declines to around 5% below trend by the end of the sample period. Government wedges rise during the 2008-2009 period, reflecting the fiscal stimulus policy known as the European Economy Recovery Plan, followed by a gradual decline reflecting the fiscal austerity measures. The confidence interval, however, is very wide compared to other wedges especially during the initial periods. Figure 4 shows simulated output in models where only one wedge is kept active. 18 The simulation with only efficiency wedges closely follows observed output performance in the post-crisis period. In the first year of the crisis the simulated output drop is almost identical to data. After that the gap between the simulated output and data slightly widens although the observed data is still contained by the 95% confidence interval. In 2014Q4 observed cross-country mean output is 23.5% below the trend level, while the predicted cross-country mean output is 17% below trend. Therefore, feeding in the efficiency wedge into the prototype model accounts for more than 70% of the observed post-crisis output drop in Europe. The remaining output decline is accounted for by investment and labor wedges. Feeding in the government wedge does not predict any output loss at all. Table 4 presents the simulation results of output for each individual country. 19 Out of the 30 European countries considered in this study, the first 19, Austria up to Spain, are the countries that adapted the Euro as their legal tender by the end of 2014. The following 8 countries, Bulgaria up to the United Kingdom, belong to the European Union, but did not adopt the Euro currency as their official medium of exchange. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, the 3 countries at the end of the list, belong to Europe, but neither accepted the Euro as their currency, nor did they join the European Union.
Computed wedges
Average simulation results
Country specific simulation results
The first column shows the total output drop over the 2007Q4-2014Q4 period. The following columns report the contribution of each wedge on output drop measured as the simulated output drop relative to the output drop in the data. The main picture we get from this analysis is that indeed the efficiency wedge is the most important wedge explaining the drop in observed post-crisis output. 20 However, some countries do not match that pattern. For Cyprus, Ireland, Bulgaria and Denmark the wedge that contributes most to output decline is, surprisingly, the investment wedge. 21 In these cases, the efficiency wedge comes second or even third. We further assess the differences in the magnitude of output drop across countries in Table 5 by regressing output drop on the decline in efficiency wedges in each country:
where j = e, i, h and −Δy n and −Δω j,n are the drops in output and wedges between 2007Q4 and 2014Q4 in each country n respectively. Since Malta is a clear outlier we focus on the remaining 29 countries for the regression. The results show that the greater the decline in each wedge the greater the output drop. In specific, a 1% decline in efficiency, investment and labor wedges is associated with declines in output of 0.534%, 0.344% and 0.437% respectively. 
Regional differences
Following Cho and Doblas-Madrid (2013), we look into the regional differences in the experiences by dividing countries into the following groups: Eastern Europe and Western Europe, Southern Europe and Northern Europe, Euro area and Non-Euro area, Nordic countries and the rest of Europe, BeNeLux countries and the rest of Europe, British Isles and the rest of Europe.
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We first consider the regional differences in the deterioration in wedges. The first 3 columns of Table 6 presents the estimation result of the following regression:
where j = e, i, h and D r,n stands for the regional dummy. We normalize the size of the drops in each wedge by the drops in output so that we have a relative measure for the size of the wedge deteriorations over the [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] period. The first column shows that Southern Europe experienced a smaller decline in efficiency wedges relative to output compared to other regions. The second column shows that there are no statistically significant regional differences in the declines of investment wedges relative to output. The third column shows that Southern Europe experienced larger drops in labor wedges relative to output compared to other regions. We next consider the effects of regional differences on the decline in each wedge. The last 3 columns of Table  6 summarizes the estimation results of the following regression:
The fourth column in Table 6 shows that the contributions of efficiency wedges are lower in Eastern and Southern Europe compared to other regions. The fifth column shows that there is no statistically significant regional differences in the contributions of investment wedges. The sixth column shows that the labor wedge contribution was greater in Southern Europe compared to other regions. This result confirms that labor wedges played a more important role in Southern Europe than they did in the rest of Europe. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors. ** and * indicate that the estimated coeffcient is significant at the 95 and 90 percent level respectively.
Discussion: Financial variables and the efficiency wedge
Given the nature of the financial crisis, we investigate the association between the cross-country differences in the decline in wedges and changes in financial variables. The financial variables we consider are the private domestic credit to GDP ratio (DC), non-performing loans to total loans ratio (NPL), the market capitalization to GDP ratio (MC), and the housing price index (HPI). 23 The data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Table 7 reports the summary statistics of the financial variables. We consider both the level of these financial variables in 2007 (denoted as 07) and the change in these variables over the 2007 to 2014 period (denoted as gr) . 24 This table shows that domestic credit and market capitalization fell by 0.8% and 12.9% relative to GDP respectively while non-performing loans increased by 17.0% relative to total loans after the crisis. The housing price index declined only slightly during this period on average. The decline in domestic credit being greater than that in GDP represents the credit crunch while the decline in market capitalization and the rise in nonperforming loans illustrates a broader concept of financial crisis. In order to investigate the relationship between the financial market and production efficiency, we run the following regression:
where F f, n stands for the financial variables listed above. Data availability limits the sample to 23 countries.
25 Table 8 summarizes the regression results. The first column presents the results for efficiency wedges. This shows that countries with lower level and growth of non-performing loans, lower growth of market capitalization and the lower growth of house price index feature a larger drop in efficiency wedges. Among all financial variables, the housing price index has the largest regression coefficient. When we adjust for the standard deviation of the regressor, the growth of market capitalization has the largest impact.
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The result that countries with larger declines in domestic credit to GDP ratio do not necessarily have a larger decline in efficiency wedges is surprising. 27 This implies that while the credit crunch could be a major explanation to the European efficiency wedge slump on average, the cross-country differences in the severity of the credit crunch cannot explain the cross-country differences in the magnitude of the decline in the efficiency wedge. One result that is particularly interesting is that the countries with higher growth in nonperforming loans feature a smaller decline in efficiency wedges. This is in fact consistent with the zombie lending phenomenon documented by Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) which states that financial institutions roll over loans to insolvent low productivity firms and collect from solvent high productivity firms in order to avoid non-performing loans and maintain a superficially healthy balance sheet. Hence, zombie lending leads to resource misallocation which manifests itself as a deterioration in the aggregate efficiency wedge. In addition, the result that the cross-country differences in the level of non-performing loans are negatively associated with the cross-country differences in the decline in efficiency wedges can be because a higher proportion of non-performing loans indicates the tendency of the economy to avoid zombie lending. Therefore, a promising avenue for future research is to investigate the zombie phenomenon in Europe.
The second column presents the results for investment wedges. This shows that none of the financial variables are associated with the cross-country difference in investment wedges. This result reinforces the findings of BCKM ( 2016) that the financial phenomenon is not necessarily associated with the investment wedge.
The third column presents the results for labor wedges. This shows that countries with a larger decline in the housing price index features a greater deterioration in labor wedges. This result is consistent with models with working capital constraint on labor in which residential capital serves as collateral for borrowing. Imagine firms whose working capital constraint is binding when there was a drop in housing prices. This leads to a decline in the collateral value and an increase in labor cost which manifests itself as a deterioration in labor wedges. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficients are significant at the 95 and 90 percent confidence level respectively.
Conclusion
In this paper we reviewed the economic experience of 30 European economies from the onset of the Great Recession in early 2008 until the end of 2014. We found that efficiency wedges are most important in accounting for the post-crisis slump while labor wedges play a more important role in Southern Europe than in other regions. Therefore, in most part of Europe the mechanism through which the financial crisis operated during this period is a deterioration in the efficiency wedge. This is consistent with recent literature of financial crises in which credit crunches lead to deterioration in aggregate production efficiency through misallocation across firms with heterogeneous productivity. We further investigate the source of cross-country differences in the magnitude of efficiency wedge declines and find that countries in which non-performing loans decline more experience less decline in efficiency wedges. This implies that misallocation in the form of zombie lending is a promising explanation to the cross-country difference in efficiency loss during the European post-crisis slump. Finally, countries with a greater decline in the housing price index experienced a greater deterioration in labor wedges. Further studies should focus on how non-performing loans and housing prices operate through each wedge during financial crises.
A Sensitivity analysis
A.1 Government wedges
In CKM ( 2007) and BCKM ( 2016) the estimation is conducted using data of output, investment, labor and government wedges. The main reason why we use consumption data instead of the government wedge data for estimation is because for Latvia and Romania there are periods in which the government wedge turns negative due to a large trade deficit. Since we cannot take logs of negative numbers, we use the consumption data which is always positive. We also prefer using the consumption data to decompose the fluctuation in consumption in the same way as the other endogenous variables.
Technically speaking, the consumption data series can be reproduced from the linearized resource constraint up to the linearization error. Therefore, the difference in estimation results should be coming from the linearization error. When the fluctuations in government wedges and consumption are large, the linearization error might become large enough to affect the accounting results. Figure 8 presents the simulation results for output using government wedges as an observable for countries except for Latvia and Romania. 28 In order to compute the cross-country mean, we used the benchmark results for Latvia and Romania. The results show that using government wedges as observables increases the importance of investment wedges in accounting for the post crisis slump. The general reason behind this result is that when we use the government wedge as an observable the linearized consumption series in the model drops less than that in the data. As a result, the role of investment wedges which encourage consumption over investment is overstated. However, the quantitative impact is not substantial. 
A.2 Adjustment costs
In this section, we investigate the impact of investment adjustment costs on the accounting results. We follow BCKM ( 2016) and assume quadratic adjustment costs in the capital accumulation equation:
The impact of investment adjustment costs have been discussed in CKM ( 2007) . They show that adjustment costs should systematically increase the contribution of investment wedges on output fluctuation. We find that this is true in our sample as well. Figure 9 presents the simulation results for output from the model with investment adjustment costs. 29 We follow CKM ( 2007) and BCKM ( 2016) and set the adjustment cost parameter ϕ for each country such that the marginal Tobin's q is equal to 1/4. The results show that the contribution of investment wedges on the post crisis slump is indeed greater when investment adjustment cost is included in the model. Nonetheless, the efficiency wedges remain the most dominant wedge in accounting for the post crisis slump in Europe. 
B Decomposition of consumption, investment and labor
In this section, we conduct the BCA decomposition for consumption, investment and labor. Table 9 and Table 10 show that efficiency wedges contribute significantly to the drop in consumption and investment in all countries except for Malta. Table 11 shows that in Germany, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Sweden and United Kingdom labor is growing relative to the pre-crisis trend. However, there is no clear pattern regarding the contributions of each wedge to the changes in labor. 
C Population weighted results
Figure 10 presents the detrended data of each country weighted by its population. It is clear that the population weighted average of each variable falls less than the benchmark simple mean of them. This is because the countries that experienced the largest economic down turn such as Greece, Estonia and Latvia are small in terms of population while those that experienced a much smaller economic down turn such as Germany and France are much larger in terms of population. Figure 11 presents the population weighted wedges. The population weighted average efficiency and labor wedge decline less than their benchmark simple mean counterparts. Government wedges increase less in the population weighted average than in the benchmark simple mean. The interesting result is the investment wedge. The population weighted average investment wedges gradually returns to the trend level while the benchmark simple mean continues to fall. This implies that investment market distortions in large countries gradually resolved while those in smaller countries remain. 
D Country groups
The countries in each regional group are listed in Table 12 . 24 Since the Housing price index cannot be compared across countries, only consider the change in housing price index. Due to data availability, the change in market capitalization is measured over the 2013 and 2014 period. 25 The countries that we drop due to data availability are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Iceland, Netherlands, Poland, and Romania. We also drop Malta as we consider it as an outlier. 26 If we multiply the regression coefficient with the regressor's standard deviation we get
which is the covariance adjusted for the cross-section variation of the regressor. This is −0.115 for the growth of market capitalization and −0.072 for the growth of housing price index. 27 This does not change when we change the variable to the growth rate of domestic credit instead of the GDP ratio. 28 Individual country results are available upon request. 29 Individual country results are available upon request.
